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Abstract
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is often interpreted as a sufficient
statistic to assess the welfare costs of taxation. Building on the conceptual
framework of Chetty (2009), we show that this assertion does no longer hold
for tax systems with deduction possibilities if (i) deductions generate exter-
nalities and (ii) deductions are responsive to tax rate changes. While the first
condition should arguably hold for almost any imaginable tax deduction, we
provide a thorough empirical examination of the second condition. Relying
on rich German panel data from administrative tax records, we exploit several
tax reforms that were implemented in Germany between 2001 and 2008. Our
baseline estimates indicate an overall ETI of 0.49 and an elasticity of deduc-
tions with respect to the net-of-tax rate of -2.80. Given that the majority of
deductions in the German income tax system generate externalities, our non-
zero deduction elasticity suggests that the ETI is not sufficient to calculate
the welfare cost of taxation.
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1 Introduction
The large literature on the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) estimates the respon-
siveness of taxpayers to income tax changes (see Saez et al. 2012 for an overview).
Recent studies find elasticities with respect to the net-of-tax rate in the range of
about 0.1 to 0.8 (e.g., Weber 2014 and Kleven and Schultz 2014), suggesting that
income taxpayers are sensitive to taxes and alter their taxable income in response
to varying tax rate changes. Following the seminal contributions by Feldstein (1995,
1999), the literature usually uses such ETI estimates as a ”sufficient statistic” to
estimate the deadweight loss of income taxes. This assumes that all types of be-
havioral responses that affect taxable income, such as labor supply adjustments,
charitable donations, or illegal evasion, have the same impact on welfare, and thus
can be boiled down to one single number, the ETI.
Chetty (2009), however, shows that the channel along which taxable income
responses occur may make a difference for the efficiency losses induced by income
taxes. If behavioral adjustments to reduce taxable income generate externalities
such as transfers to other agents in the economy, losses to overall welfare are lower
compared to cases in which behavioral adjustments are associated with real resource
costs. In the extreme case in which a behavioral adjustment produces a pure ex-
ternality and does not impose any resource costs, the gross income elasticity, rather
than the ETI, becomes the relevant parameter for welfare analysis. In a more general
case with externalities and resource costs, Chetty’s analysis shows that the welfare
loss is a weighted average of the ETI and the gross income elasticity. These results
imply that it is important for welfare analyses of tax reforms to disentangle the
relative importance of the single adjustment channels that contribute to the ETI.
In this paper, we explore the welfare effects of tax reforms in the presence of
tax deductions. We hence focus on a specific adjustment channel which is common
and important in all personal income tax systems across the world. For instance,
in the US, itemized deductions represent about 12% of all taxable income, worth
$80 billion in total (Saez 2004a).1 Based on the framework of Chetty (2009), we
show that the ETI is not a sufficient statistic if (i) claimed deductions generate
externalities and (ii) if deductions are responsive to tax rate changes.
In general, governments allow for deduction possibilities in the tax law to
encourage certain behavior or expenses that produce benefits – in the future or
present. In other words, the rationale behind deductions usually is to incentivize
1The ratio of deductions to taxable income is even higher in Germany (see below). Deductions
generally play an important role in all developed countries’ personal income tax codes (Ernst &
Young 2013), suggesting that our results are not only relevant for Germany or the US.
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behavior that generates interpersonal or intertemporal externalities. For example,
deductions in the form of charitable donations are transferred to another agent in
the economy, implying that the amount deducted is not lost but serving society.
Deductible investments in education or professional training will increase human
capital leading to higher incomes and hence higher tax revenues in the future. Given
the purpose and character of most deductions, we argue that the first condition for
the ETI not to be a sufficient statistic is likely to be fulfilled: all well-designed and
well-intended deductions generate non-negligible externalities.2
The second condition for a non-sufficient ETI is fulfilled if a non-zero deduc-
tion elasticity with respect to changes in the net-of-tax rate is estimated empirically.
From a theoretical perspective, tax deductions should respond to tax rate changes
given that a higher tax rate makes the claiming of tax deductions more attractive.
In the empirical part of the paper, we test this hypothesis and examine the respon-
siveness of deductions to taxes. We use rich German panel data from administrative
tax records that provide detailed information on all income tax relevant parameters
including all available tax deductions.
We exploit variation in tax rates induced by various income tax reforms im-
plemented in Germany in the early 2000s. These reforms affected different types
of taxpayers differently. For instance, over this period, the top marginal tax rate
decreased from 53% to 42% in several steps, and the lowest marginal tax rate from
24% to 15%, while tax rates in the middle of the distribution where hardly affected.
These differential reform intensities allow identification of the tax rate effect on de-
duction behavior. Given our research question, studying the case of Germany is of
particular interest since the German tax system allows for a very large set of de-
ductions: on average, taxable income is more than 20% lower than reported broad
income with variation over the income distribution and by income source, and there
are more than 500 different deduction possibilities (Kirchhof 2011).3
We start our empirical analysis with estimating tax elasticities for different
income concepts (broad gross income vs. taxable income) and continue with the
analysis for different types of deductions. The empirical identification of the impact
of tax changes on deductions generally faces the same econometric challenges as the
identification of the ETI: first, there exists a mechanical relationship between tax
2Despite generating positive externalities, some deductions may additionally incur welfare losses.
For example, if extension possibilities lead to overconsumption, sheltering behavior will be associ-
ated with resource costs that reduce the economic pie. Welfare costs may also arise because of the
opportunity costs of filing deductions.
3Bach et al. (2013) analyze the ratio of taxable income in reported broad income over time.
Their findings are broadly in line with our numbers although they employ a different concept of
broad income and use a different data source.
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deductions and tax rates in progressive tax systems, and second, mean reversion as
well as heterogeneous income trends have to be accounted for. This motivates us to
employ the same empirical strategy for the ETI and deduction elasticity estimations
based on the frequently used instrumental variable (IV) methodology initiated by
Gruber and Saez (2002).4
Our findings suggest a statistically significant elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the net-of-tax rate of around 0.49. As most other studies, we find a lower
elasticity of gross income (EGI); the estimate being not statistically different from
zero. The results further show that the difference between ETI and EGI is driven by
deductions that are indeed responsive to changes in the net-of-tax rate: the elasticity
of deductions is estimated at -2.80 and statistically highly significant. We addition-
ally show that the behavioral response is mainly due to (itemized) deductions which
are relatively less likely to be third-party reported and where taxpayers are more
likely to have a choice of claiming. Our results are robust to several sensitivity
checks.
Given that deductions generate externalities, the strong response of deduction
behavior to tax rates demonstrates that the ETI is not a sufficient statistic. Hence,
our first contribution is to add to the literature discussing the ETI and its potential
role as a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis. Besides the rather recent contribu-
tions by Chetty (2009) and Gorodnichenko et al. (2009), a series of earlier papers
has identified revenue offset, i.e., shifting income to other tax bases, as a threat to
the interpretation of the ETI as a sufficient statistic since revenue leakage in one
base will induce revenue gains in another (Slemrod 1998; Gordon and Slemrod 2002;
Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002; Saez 2004b).
As our second contribution, we add to the literature by providing further
information on the “anatomy of tax systems”.5 As pointed out by Slemrod (1996),
Saez (2003) or Saez et al. (2012), detailed knowledge about the different adjustment
channels underlying the ETI is desirable because government has full control over
the definition of taxable income. Knowing the responsiveness of its components can
hence help to design (more) efficient tax systems.6 So far, direct evidence on the
4This literature is surveyed in Saez et al. (2012). Recent applications such as Chetty et al.
(2011) or Kleven and Schultz (2014) also exploit local kinks in tax schedules to identify the ETI.
Such an approach is, however, not applicable to the German case since there are no tax brackets
in the German tax schedule.
5Our study is also related to the literature showing that charitable giving (donations being
usually tax deductible) is responsive to income tax changes (see, e.g., Joulfaian 2000, Yo¨ru¨k 2013
and Andreoni 2006 for a survey).
6Among all possible adjustment channels that are summarized in the ETI, the responsiveness
of labor supply has so far received the most attention in the literature finding modest behavioral
elasticities in the range of 0 to 0.3 (see Blundell and MaCurdy 1999 and Bargain et al. 2014 for
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effect of taxes on tax deduction behavior is relatively scarce. Exceptions are Matikka
(2014) who presents suggestive evidence from Finland that certain deductions are
responsive to income taxes, and Bastani and Selin (2014) whose analysis points
in the direction that taxable income responses of Swedish self-employed mainly
occur through legal tax avoidance rather than labor supply adjustments. Moreover,
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) and Kopczuk (2005) show that the ETI is considerably
larger in tax systems with more deduction possibilities providing evidence that the
ETI is not an immutable parameter but rather a policy choice (see, e.g., Slemrod
1994; Slemrod 1995; Slemrod 1998). There is also evidence that broad gross income
is less responsive to tax changes than taxable income (Saez et al. 2012; Kleven
and Schultz 2014). These studies indicate that the adjustment of tax deductions
might be relevant, but they do not provide direct evidence that deduction behavior
is responsive to tax rate changes since a smaller elasticity for broad than taxable
income does not necessarily imply that deductions respond to tax rate changes as
we show in Section 2.1.
Providing new ETI estimates for Germany is our third contribution. There are
only a few studies that examine the ETI for Germany (Gottfried and Witczak 2009,
Massarrat-Mashhadi and Werdt 2012, Schmidt and Mu¨ller 2012) which we extend by
using a larger panel data set along with additional estimation methods. Besides the
vast amount of deduction possibilities, the case of Germany is interesting because
of the unique German tax schedule that does not have tax brackets but rather a tax
formula that generates linearly increasing marginal tax rates over a large segment
of the tax income distribution.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework.
We first present an extension of the Chetty (2009) model (2.1) and then present our
empirical strategy (2.2). In Section 3, we describe the institutional background and
the tax reforms that we exploit for identification. Section 4 informs about the data
set we use and presents summary statistics. Our results are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 discusses the results and concludes the paper.
surveys). Other channels that have been found to contribute to the ETI are, e.g., inter- and intra-
temporal income shifting (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997, Kreiner et al. 2013, Harju and Matikka
2013, Kreiner et al. 2014), or tax non-compliance (Gorodnichenko et al. 2009; Kleven et al. 2011).
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2 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Theoretical Model
Tax deductions are intended to either compensate (disadvantageous) individuals for
distributional reasons (e.g., deductions for disabled people) or to encourage certain
behaviors or expenses that generate benefits for society (Poterba 2011). Examples of
the latter include charitable donations, the deduction of insurance fees to encourage
the healthy to buy insurance or child-care costs to stimulate labor supply. Other
deductions often exist to expense investments in human capital. Since the returns
to human capital investments are fully taxed (in forms of higher income in later
periods), there are no efficiency costs over the life-cycle if deducting investment
costs leads to efficient investment decisions. Thus, deductions serve the purpose to
incentivize taxpayers (by offering reductions in the tax burden) to behave in a way
that produces externalities to society. Overall, it is, by definition, difficult to think
of a deduction that is not associated with either an interpersonal or intertemporal
transfer.7 As a consequence, taxable income adjustments in the form of deductions
are likely to affect the available economic pie differently than other adjustment
margins (e.g., tax evasion or labor supply). Deductions might even increase efficiency
relative to an allocation in which the externalities of the deductible expense are
not generated. If the value of each deduction (deductible amount times marginal
tax rate) corresponded to the optimal Pigouvian subsidy, individuals would behave
optimally and claim the socially optimal amount of deductions.
To study the effect of deduction possibilities more formally, we adopt the the-
oretical model developed by Chetty (2009) to the case of tax deductions. While
Chetty’s contribution has mostly been discussed in the context of tax evasion, his
point is more general and his model can account for all different kinds of tax shel-
tering behavior. Let us assume that an individual chooses working hours L and
tax avoidance effort (in the form of claiming tax deductions) D to maximize utility
U = U(C,L,D), where C denotes consumption. There are economic opportunity
costs (resource costs) of claiming deductions g(D), which negatively affect utility.8
Utility is defined as U = C − ψ(L) − g(D), where ψ(L) denotes the disutility of
7Our static framework does not explicitly account for intertemporal transfers such as education
investments from the present to the future. However, the intuition is similar since transfers over
time do not decrease (the present value of) the economic pie. Hence, interpersonal transfers can
be interpreted as intertemporal ones in this setting.
8These resource costs could be interpreted either as deviations from first-best, socially optimal
behavior (because the value of the deduction t · D does not correspond to the optimal Pigou-
vian subsidy) or simply the opportunity costs in terms of, e.g., foregone leisure due to collecting
deductions bills or understanding the tax code.
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labor. The budget constraint of the individual is determined by unearned income
Y , labor income wL with w being a given wage, the purchase of deductions D and
a tax t on labor income after deductions wl −D: C + D + t(wL−D) = Y + wL.9
Thus, the individual solves the following maximization problem:
max
L,D
U = C − ψ(L)− g(D)
s.t. C = Y + (1− t)(wL−D)
First order conditions are given by:
(1− t)w = ψ′(L)
t = g′(D) + 1,
showing that both labor supply and deduction claiming depend on the tax rate.
Social welfare W is the sum of individual utility (in curly brackets), tax rev-
enues t(wL−D) and externality e(D), which depends on deduction behavior:
W (t) = {Y + (1− t)(wL−D)− ψ(L)− g(D)}+ t(wL−D) + e(D).
Besides specifying the individual costs of deducting directly as D, we also deviate
from the original model by introducing the externality e(D), which does not have to
be identical to the costs of sheltering. Modeling the welfare function such that the
sheltered amount D is identical to the externality is, for example, appropriate for the
case of tax evasion, in which the sheltered amount may generate a fine that directly
enters the government’s budget. In our case in which the sheltered amount is the
tax deduction, it seems, however, appropriate that the deduction D might have a
different value for society than for the agent who claimed the deduction. Take a
donation to a charitable organization as an example. It is likely that donations
generate a welfare effect worth more or less than its money value, depending on the
mission and the efficiency of the charitable organization. We will re-address this
feature of the model in the concluding section of this paper.
9As opposed to Chetty (2009), who provides a micro-foundation of transfer costs using fines for
tax evasion as an example, we assume that the costs of sheltering (here: purchase of a deduction)
equal the actual amount spent on the deductible good or service. Hence, we simply use D as the
costs of deducting. In a more general case (or in the evasion example by Chetty), the costs of
deducting could also be some function of the deduction amount, z(D), and therefore be different
from D. Note that our assumption does not change the results since the concrete specification of
the costs of sheltering in the agent’s budget constraint is irrelevant for the calculation of marginal
welfare costs because of the envelope conditions.
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In order to arrive at the well-known ETI formula, we differentiate social welfare
with respect to the tax rate t. Using the envelope theorem and the fact that taxable
income TI is gross income GI minus deductions, TI = GI−D = wL−D, we derive
the following formula for the marginal welfare effect of taxes:
dW (t)
dt
= t
dTI
dt
+
de
dD
dD
dt
which already shows that the ETI is not a sufficient statistic if deductions come with
a transfer and are responsive to taxes (i.e., de
dD
dD
dt
6= 0). Defining the elasticities of
taxable income and the deductions elasticity as εTI = −dTIdt 1−tT I and εD = −dDdt 1−tD ,
respectively, we get
dW (t)
dt
= − 1
1− t [tT IεTI + e
′(D)DεD]. (1)
This expression reveals that (i) if deductions exist (D > 0) and (ii) if there
are externalities e that vary with deduction behavior D ( de
dD
= e′(D) 6= 0) and (iii)
if deductions respond to tax rates (εD 6= 0), the elasticity of taxable income, εTI , is
not a sufficient statistic to calculate the welfare costs of marginal tax changes.
Note that several studies have interpreted differences in elasticities of broad
and taxable income as suggestive evidence that deductions are responsive to tax rate
changes.10 We argue that this does not have to be the case: the difference between
reported gross income GI and taxable income TI is attributed to deductions, TI =
GI −D, so that dTI
dt
= dGI
dt
− dD
dt
. This relationship can easily be used to show that
εTI =
GI
TI
εGI − GI − TI
TI
εD, (2)
where elasticities are defined as above. This simple exercise illustrates that the
elasticity of taxable income εTI depends on the responsiveness of broad gross income,
εGI , and deductions, εD, as well as the shares of broad gross income and deductions
in taxable income, GI
TI
and D
TI
. Note that GI
TI
is typically larger than one because
some type of deductions or exemptions are usually subtracted from broad gross
10For example, Saez et al. (2012, page 39) state that ”Gruber and Saez’s elasticity estimate
for broad income, 0.12, is notably smaller than their corresponding estimate for taxable income,
suggesting that much of the taxable income response comes through deductions, exemptions, and
exclusions”.
7
income in any tax system.11 Hence, εTI is larger than εGI even if deductions were
not responsive to tax rate changes, i.e., if εD = 0. As a consequence, the conclusion
that deduction behavior is responsible for differences between ETI and the elasticity
of broad gross income is not necessarily valid.
We derive two main implications from our theoretical framework. First, ac-
cording to expression (1), the ETI is not a sufficient statistic if there are tax de-
ductions (D 6= 0) that (i) generate externalities (e′(D) 6= 0) and (ii) are responsive
to tax rate changes (εD 6= 0). Second, in order to infer deduction behavior from
the elasticities of gross and taxable income, it is not sufficient to compare the two
elasticities but income shares have to be taken into account (see equation 2). In
the empirical analysis, we, therefore, estimate the elasticities of gross and taxable
income as well as the elasticity of tax deductions. This allows us to infer which
components of taxable income are most responsive to taxes.
2.2 Empirical Model and Identification
This section describes the empirical model and outlines our identification strategy.
In order to estimate the effect of the net-of-tax rate on different income or deduction
measures, we employ the standard ETI panel regression model following Gruber and
Saez (2002). For taxpayer i in year t, we regress the change in our left-hand side
variable of interest (either taxable income, gross income or deductions), ∆Yi,t, on
changes in the marginal net-of-tax rate, ∆(1 − τi,t). The operator ∆ indicates the
difference between year t and base-year t − k. In our baseline specification, we set
k = 2 as, e.g., in Chetty et al. (2011). Specifically, we estimate the following model:
∆ lnYi,t = εY ∆ ln(1− τi,t) + f(GIi,t−k) + φXi,t + γt + ηi,t, (3)
where f(GIi,t−k) is a function of individual base-year gross income, Xi,t a vector
containing standard demographic variables (dummies for joint filing / marital status,
number of children, and West- vs. East-Germany), γt a set of year fixed effects and
ηi,t an individual error term.
12
The coefficient of interest, εY , can be directly interpreted as an elasticity since
the outcome measure Yi,t and the net-of-tax rate (1 − τi,t) enter the regression in
logs. We follow standard practice in the literature to address potential threats to
identification (Saez et al. 2012). First, we use panel data and estimate the model
11In Germany, GITI is 1.26 on average, see Section 4 for more detailed summary statistics.
12Note that in our empirical specification we abstract from estimating income effects as this is
common in the literature. See, e.g., Blomquist and Selin (2010) for a study allowing for income
effects.
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in differences to wipe out time-invariant individual confounders. Second, following
Auten and Carroll (1999), we account for mean reversion and secular trends in
income inequality by controlling for base year income. Specifically, we add 10-piece
splines of base-year gross income, f(GIi,t−k), in our baseline (as, e.g., in Chetty et al.
2011).
Third, we have to account for the mechanical relationship between our left-
hand side variables and the net-of-tax rate in progressive tax systems. An increase
in income automatically changes the net-of-tax rate because in progressive systems
higher incomes are taxed at higher marginal tax rates. The same reasoning applies
when tax deductions are used on the left-hand side of the equation: higher deduction
claims reduce taxable income and therefore also affect the tax rate. This mechanical
relationship between the left-hand side variables and (1 − τi,t) requires to find an
instrument for the net-of-tax rate that is unrelated to the error term in the above
regression model. Following Gruber and Saez (2002), most studies in the literature
use an instrument which is based on predicted changes in tax rates that are solely
due to legislative tax reforms (e.g., Chetty et al. 2011 and Kleven and Schultz 2014).
The net-of-tax rate in year t is instrumented with the ”synthetic” net-of-tax rate
(1− τ synthi,t ) that is constructed by applying the tax schedule in year t to income in
year t − k. As a result, the synthetic instrument only captures statutory tax rate
changes caused by reforms while it abstracts from mechanical tax rate changes in
progressive tax systems that are due to changing income (or deductions).
Fourth, mechanical effects induced by simultaneous tax rate and tax base
reforms have important implications for the definition and construction of variables
for our analysis. Note that this is a general problem of changing tax base definitions
faced by most studies estimating the ETI. To circumvent this complication, the
literature uses the broadest definition of the tax base (see Saez et al. 2012) when
tax base changes occur at the same time as tax rate changes. We follow this approach
in our paper.13
We estimate regression model (3) using two-stage least squares and cluster
standard errors on the individual level. First-stage regressions (not shown) of
∆ ln(1 − τi,t) on ∆ ln(1 − τ synthi,t ) are very strong with F−statistics exceeding 250.
Figure 2 in the Appendix provides graphical evidence of the first stage (Panel A)
and the reduced-form regression (Panel B) following the exposition of Weber (2014).
More precisely, in panel A (B), the figure plots a fourth-order local polynomial re-
gression of the change in the log marginal net-of-tax rate (log taxable income) on
13Note that using this broadest tax base approach might underestimate the responsiveness of
deductions. The reason for this is that the broadest base might mask some behavioral responses
in case of changes in cap limits or minimum amounts.
9
the changes in the predicted log marginal net-of-tax rate. Looking at panel A, the
instrument is performing well even for large changes in the marginal net-of-tax rates
as indicated by the narrow 95% confidence bands over the whole distribution of tax
changes. Panel B indicates that the average taxable income change is increasing
with predicted marginal net-of-tax rate changes.
3 Institutional Background
3.1 The personal income tax in Germany
All individuals in Germany are subject to personal income taxation. Residents are
taxed on their global income; non-residents are taxed on income earned in Germany
only.14 The basic steps for the calculation of the personal income tax under German
tax law are illustrated by table 1.
Table 1: Calculation of the personal income tax
Sum of broad gross income (GI) from 7 sources (3 types of self-
employment income; labor income; 3 types of capital income)
- Income-related deduction (Dincome)
= Adjusted gross income (AGI)
- Deductions and allowances
for “Special expenses” and “Extraordinary burden” (Dother)
- Child allowance
= Taxable Income (TI)
· Tax formula
= Tax liability
+ Tax credits
= Tax due (T )
Broad gross income, GI. The first step is to determine a tax unit’s broad gross
income from different sources and to allocate it to the seven forms of income the Ger-
man tax law distinguishes between: income from agriculture and forestry, business
income, self-employment income, salaries and wages from employment, investment
income, rental income, and other income (including, for example, annuities and cer-
tain capital gains).15 GI is used in our regression analyses to identify the sensitivity
14The legal norm setting up the German tax system is called Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG).
15The following types of income are tax exempt: payments from health insurance, accident
insurance and insurance for disability and old age, welfare benefits and scholarships.
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of broad income.
Adjusted gross income, AGI. Second, for each type of income, the tax law
allows for certain income-related expenses (Werbungskosten). In principle, all ex-
penses that are necessary to obtain, maintain or preserve the income from a source
are deductible. These include, for instance, commuting costs, expenses for work
materials or costs of training. For non-itemizing taxpayers, there is an allowance
for labor earnings (e920 in 2008) and capital income (e750 in 2008). The sum of
broad gross income minus income-related deductions per income source yields the
adjusted gross income.
Taxable income, TI. As a third step, further deductions are taken into account
and subtracted from adjusted gross income yielding taxable income. These other
deductions comprise special expenses (Sonderausgaben) and expenses for extraordi-
nary burden (außergewo¨hnliche Belastungen). A detailed list of examples for other
deductions is shown in Table 2.16 Moreover, negative income from the preceding
assessment period (loss deduction carried back) can be subtracted from adjusted
gross income. Last, each tax unit with children receives either a child allowance or
a child benefit, depending on which is more favorable. We use TI as a dependent
variable in the regressions to derive the ETI.
Deductions, D. The German personal income tax law allows for a vast num-
ber of potential deductions: According to Kirchhof (2011), there are “at least 534
different” deduction possibilities. First, as mentioned above, all income-related de-
ductions, Dincome, that are necessary to generate or earn income can be deducted.
This includes, e.g., commuting costs or expenses to buy working clothes. In addi-
tion, expenses for mandatory public or voluntary private pension insurance, as well
as health and unemployment insurance, can be deducted. Compared to other de-
ductions, income-related deductions are more likely to be third-party reported and
automatically deducted from the broad gross income. This implies that taxpayers
often neither have a choice whether to make the expense nor whether to claim it on
the tax return.
Second, other deductions, Dother, which are split into special expenses and
extraordinary burden expenses can be deducted. These itemized deductions are
typically self-reported and involve (much more) choices of the individual taxpay-
ers. The former category includes expenses for investment in human capital (own
education or professional training as well as expenses for education of children),
16In contrast to many other countries, mortgage interest payments are not tax deductible.
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Table 2: Overview of other (itemized) deductions
Category
Special Expenses
Alimony payments
Church tax
Tax consultant fees
Expenses for professional training
School fees of children
Charitable donations
Donations to political parties
Insurance fees
Social insurance contributions
Extraordinary Burden
Expenses
Expenses for the education of dependents, for the cure
of illness, for home help with elderly or disabled people,
commuting expenses caused by disability
Child care costs
Tax allowances for self used proprietary, premises and
historical buildings
Allowances for disabled persons, surviving dependents
and persons in need of care
child care costs, donations to charity or political parties and church tax payments.17
These examples show that ”sheltering” in the form of tax deductions usually does
not serve the purpose of maximizing after-tax income, but is instead intended to
internalize externalities such as transfers to other agents in the economy or invest-
ments that yield higher taxable income in the future and are hence taxed later in
the life-cycle. In our regressions, we use income-related deductions, Dincome, other
deductions, Dother, as well as their sum (called total deductions Dtotal) as dependent
variables to estimate the deductions elasticity.
Tax due, T . The income tax is calculated by applying the tax schedule to taxable
income. In contrast to most other countries who use a bracket system with constant
marginal tax rates within a bracket, Germany uses a formula (which is quadratic in
income) to compute the tax liability. As a consequence, marginal tax rates increase
linearly in income (up to an top marginal tax rate of 42%). The formula for the
17Extraordinary burden expenses, which are relatively unimportant in magnitude on average,
grant taxpayers allowances in extraordinary circumstances: disabled persons, surviving dependents
and persons in need of care.
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year 2008 is defined as follows18:
T =

0 ifTI ≤ 7, 664
(883.74TI−7,664
10,000
+ 1, 500)TI−7,664
10,000
if 7, 664 < TI ≤ 12, 739
(228.74TI−12,739
10,000
+ 2, 397)TI−12,739
10,000
+ 989 if 12, 739 < TI ≤ 52, 151
0.42TI − 7, 914 if 52, 151 < TI ≤ 250, 000
0.45TI − 15, 414 ifTI > 250, 000.
(4)
In addition to the personal income tax, households additionally pay the “Sol-
idarita¨tszuschlag”, a tax supplement originally introduced to finance the German
reunification. During the period of interest, 2000 - 2008, the supplement amounts
to 5.5% of the income tax liability.19
3.2 Reforms 2001–2008
Figure 1 shows the marginal tax rate schedule for the years 2001-03, 2004 and 2005-
08. Taxpayers with a high taxable income and those with a taxable income slightly
exceeding the basic tax allowance experienced the largest marginal tax rate cuts.20
Between 2000 and 2005, a major reform of the German personal income tax took
place. The basic tax allowance was increased in several steps from e6902 in 2000
to e7664 (2004–2008) with e7206 in 2001 and e7235 in 2002/03. The lowest
marginal tax rate decreased from 22.9% in 2000 to 15% (2005–2008) with 19.9%
(2001–03) and 16% (2004) in between. The top marginal tax rate was reduced from
51% in 2000 to 42% in 2005 with 48.5% (2001-03) and 45% (2004) in between.
The threshold where the top marginal tax rate kicks in was reduced from e58, 643
in 2000 to e52, 151 in 2004 with values of e55, 007 (2001-03) in between. In
2007, an additional tax bracket at the top (for taxable income above e250, 000) was
introduced with a top marginal tax rate of 45%. Tax rates in the medium range of
the schedule were lowered as well.
18For married taxpayers filing jointly, the tax is twice the amount of applying the formula to
half of the married couple’s joint taxable income: T (TI1 + TI2) = 2 ∗ T
(
TI1+TI2
2
)
.
19The exact rule is slightly more complicated with a minimum tax amount resulting in the kink
visible in Figure 1 at roughly 15,000e .
20Figure 3 in the Appendix plots the income distribution along the marginal tax rate schedule.
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Figure 1: Marginal tax rates
4 Data and Summary Statistics
Data set. We use the German Taxpayer Panel, which is an administrative data
set collected by German tax authorities, provided and administered by the Ger-
man Federal Statistical Office (Kriete-Dodds and Vorgrimler 2007). The unit of
observation is the taxpayer, i.e., either a single individual or a couple filing jointly.
The panel covers all German tax units in the period 2001 to 2008. We have access
to a 5% random sample of the Taxpayer Panel and employ the respective weights
provided by the Statistical Office. The dataset contains all information necessary
to calculate a taxpayer’s annual income tax, this includes basic socio-demographic
characteristics such as birth date, gender, family status, number of children as well
as detailed information on income sources and tax base parameters such as work-
related expenses and (claimed and realized) deductions.
Sample selection. We restrict our estimation sample to individuals who have
a positive income above e10, 000 (in real 2001 terms) in each period. We further
exclude taxpayers who change their marital status throughout the sample period
because this implies a change from individual to joint filing or vice versa, and re-
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strict the sample to individuals in the range of ages 18 to 65 (the pension age in
Germany). We also have to exclude a few taxpayers with implausible demographic
characteristics (e.g., change of gender or date of birth) that are due to data errors.
These restrictions leave us with a sample of about 1.9 million observations. In line
with the literature, our regressions are weighted with taxable income and the sample
weights.
Summary Statistics. For our analysis, we look at 5 different dependent variables
(see Sections 2.2 and 3.1): (1) taxable income TI, (2) broad gross income GI, (3)
total deductions Dtotal, which consist of (4) income-related deductions Dinc and (5)
other deductions Dother (with Dtotal = Dinc + Dother). Table 4 in the Appendix
shows descriptive statistics for these five variables. On average, the ratio between
TI and GI is 0.79, which implies that total deductions account for about 20% of
gross income. Comparing income-related and other deductions, the table shows
that income-related expenses only make up for 12% of total deductions on average.
Hence, other (itemized) deductions are relatively more important for the reduction
of taxable income in Germany.
5 Results
This section presents regression evidence using all tax reforms between 2001 and
2008 for identifying variation. The results are based on equation (3) and stem from
2SLS regressions using the Gruber/Saez instrument. Table 3 depicts the regression
estimates for different dependent variables. The dependent variables are two-year
growth rates of taxable income (TI), broad gross income (GI), total deductions
(Dtotal), income-related deductions (Dinc), and other deductions (Dother) (see section
3.1 for more information on the definitions of these variables).
Panel A of Table 3 depicts our baseline estimates where we regress two-year
differences in our log dependent variables on two-year differences in the log marginal
net-of-tax rate, instrumented with the standard Gruber and Saez (2002) synthetic
tax rate change (as, e.g., in Chetty et al. (2011)). We estimate a highly significant
elasticity of taxable income of 0.49 (I). The elasticity of gross income is considerably
lower and not significantly different from zero (II). Comparing our results to the
literature, we find that our ETI estimates are broadly in line with recent studies
using similar models and estimators (Chetty 2009; Weber 2014; Kleven and Schultz
2014).
As many other previous studies, we also find that the elasticity of gross income
is significantly lower than the ETI. However, our study is the first to explore explic-
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Table 3: ETI and deduction elasticities
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Dependent Variable TI GI Dtotal Dinc Dother
Panel A: Baseline specification
∆log(1− τ) 0.490∗∗∗ 0.009 -2.785∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗ -3.192∗∗∗
(15.67) (0.38) (-49.32) (-2.42) (-49.99)
F − Stat 300.8 300.8 307.3 297.6 300.8
N 1,432,094 1,432,094 1,417,867 1,329,497 1,432,017
Panel B: Baseline specification with additional income controls
∆log(1− τ) 0.330∗∗∗ 0.033 -1.825∗∗∗ 0.006 -2.113∗∗∗
(9.34) (1.18) (-30.99) (0.16) (-30.92)
F − Stat 275.2 275.2 281.0 272.5 275.2
N 1,185,604 1,185,604 1,173,006 1,099,115 1,185,544
Panel C: Baseline specification with three-year growth rates
∆log(1− τ) 0.364∗∗∗ 0.051∗ -1.942∗∗∗ 0.128∗ -2.261∗∗∗
(9.69) (1.87) (-32.22) (1.84) (-33.79)
F − Stat 417.9 417.9 423.2 409.7 417.9
N 1,186,233 1,186,233 1,174,648 1,099,299 1,186,169
Panel D: Baseline specification with Weber (2014) instrument
∆log(1− τ) 1.014∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ -3.567∗∗∗ -0.008 -4.010∗∗∗
(11.72) (5.86) (-23.05) (-0.10) (-23.67)
F − Stat 302.3 302.3 300.1 288.2 302.3
N 1,185,685 1,185,685 1,173,054 1,099,153 1,185,624
Notes: 2SLS regressions based on equation (3) with t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors
clustered on the taxpayer level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01. German tax
return data for 2001-2008. Results are based on a 5% random sample of the universe of German
taxpayers. Dependent variables in all panels are (I) taxable income TI, (II) broad gross income
GI, (III) total deductions Dtotal, (IV) income-related deductions Dinc and (V) other (itemized)
deductions Dother. All dependent variables are logged. Independent variable of interest is the two-
year growth rate in the marginal net-of-tax rate (i.e., ∆log(1−τ)), instrumented with the two-year
growth rate in the synthetic net-of-tax rate based on base-year t− 2 behavior (Gruber/Saez-type
instrument). Reported coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities identified from tax reforms.
All specifications include year fixed effects, region fixed effects (East vs. West Germany), controls
for demographic variables (Dummies for number of children, marital status) as well as 10-piece
splines in logged base-year income. The sample is restricted to tax units with taxable income
above e10, 000 (in real 2001 terms), who are 18-65 years old and do not change their filing status
throughout the sample period. All specifications are weighted with taxable income and provided
sample weights. F −Stat indicates the first-stage F-statistic and N is the number of observations.
Panel A is the baseline specification as described. Panel B adds income controls specified as
10-piece splines based on the log-deviation between base-year and base-year+1 income (following
Kopczuk 2005). Panel C uses three-year growth rates instead of two-year growth rates. Panel D
uses a Weber (2014)-type instrument where the instrument is based on behavior in the year prior
to base-year t− 3.
itly whether responsive deductions are the reason for this difference in elasticities.
Columns (III) to (V) show that, as expected, deductions respond negatively to in-
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creases in the net-of-tax rate. For the sum of all deductions Dtotal, we estimate a
highly significant elasticity of -2.785. This effect is driven by (itemized) other deduc-
tions Dother (V) rather than income-related deductions Dinc (IV) for which we esti-
mate a very low elasticity. This is reassuring given that taxpayers have much more
discretion whether to claim (itemized) Dother-type deductions, while income-related
deductions Dinc are often automatically accounted for and third-party reported.
We conduct several robustness checks to make sure that our estimates are
not driven by modeling choices. In a first step, we additionally include 10-piece
splines based on the log deviation between base-year and base-year+1 income in
our specifications, as suggested by Kopczuk (2005) and recently applied in Kleven
and Schultz (2014). The inclusion of the second set of splines is intended to control
better for transitory income components. Estimates in Panel B show that elasticities
decrease slightly in absolute terms but the general pattern does not change. Most
importantly, deductions are still found to be very responsive to tax rate changes.
Next, in Panel C, we regress three-year growth rates in our dependent variable
on three-year changes in the log net-of-tax rates as, e.g., in Kleven and Schultz
(2014), instead of using two-year differences. Again, estimates are hardly affected.
Last in Panel D, we address recent concerns that the Gruber/Saez synthetic
instrument is not exogenous (see, e.g., Weber 2014 or Blomquist and Selin 2010).
Although it is possible to control for base-year income in flexible ways (e.g., by
including income splines), it is not clear if any correlation between the Gruber/Saez
instrument and the error term is controlled for. We hence apply an approach recently
suggested by Weber (2014), in which the synthetic tax rate is based on a lag of
base-year income, e.g., t− k− 1, instead of base-year income t− k as in Gruber and
Saez (2002). This approach reduces, and ideally abolishes, the correlation between
the error term and the instrument. Panel D shows that using this plausibly more
exogenous instrument yields significantly higher elasticity estimates. This is well in
line with the original application of the estimation strategy in Weber (2014). Again,
the general pattern of our baseline specification is preserved. In particular, gross
income responds less than taxable income and deductions remain to be very sensitive
to tax rate changes, which is main empirical contribution of this paper (independent
of the exact magnitudes of the elasticity estimates).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically that the ETI is not a suf-
ficient statistic for analyzing the welfare effects of tax reforms in the presence of tax
17
deductions. Our theoretical framework reveals that the ETI is not the appropriate
welfare parameter if (i) deductions generate externalities and (ii) deductions are
responsive to tax rate changes. While the first condition holds in arguably all cases,
we use German tax return data to demonstrate empirically that deductions respond
negatively to net-of-tax rates, implying that the second condition holds as well.
Given that most tax systems around the world allow for deduction possibilities,
the findings in our paper cast doubt on the merits of using the ETI to design optimal
tax systems in practice. We show that instead of the ETI, a combination of the ETI,
the deduction elasticity and the marginal externality of deducting expenses deter-
mines the marginal costs of a tax increase. The challenge for researchers, therefore,
is to develop research designs that allow to estimate not only the ETI and deduc-
tion elasticity, but also to identify the marginal externality and the responsiveness
of tax deductions. While this paper provides a set of results on the former measures,
the question of how to empirically pin down the marginal externality is yet to be
answered.21
Recalling equation (1), dW (t)
dt
= − 1
1−t [tT IεTI + e
′(D)DεD], we can, neverthe-
less, try to assess how relevant the presence of deduction possibilities is for the
interpretation of the ETI as a sufficient statistic. In particular, the relative differ-
ence between the first and the second part of the term in brackets (normalized by
gross income) is crucial: tTI
GI
εTI versus e
′(D) D
GI
εD. Using mean values from table
4, and our central estimates of ETI and deduction elasticities (εTI = 0.490 and
εDtotal = −2.785) and assuming a marginal tax rate t of 0.3 (sample mean), we get
0.12 for the first and −0.56 · e′(D) for the second term. Even if we assume that
every euro deducted (and thus transferred to a third agent) is worth only half its
money value, i.e. e′(D) = 0.5, the additional marginal welfare costs induced by
accounting for deducting behavior (the second term) is larger (in absolute terms)
than the costs if the ETI was a sufficient statistic (the first term). Note that these
numbers may be particularly large in Germany for two reasons. First, there are
vast deductions possibilities in Germany leading ceteris paribus to a relatively large
second term - especially if a taxpayer decides to hire a professional tax preparer.
Second, the peculiar German tax schedule that has no brackets and therefore hardly
any kink points is likely to yield low real responses to tax rate changes, which is
also indicated by the low elasticity of gross income that we estimate. Nevertheless,
the simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the presence of deduction
possibilities are likely to lead to marginal deadweight costs of taxation, which are
21Note that Chetty (2009) derives the welfare loss as a weighted average of the ETI and the
EGI. However, estimating the weight, i.e., the marginal resource cost of sheltering in his model, is
also not trivial (see, e.g., the concluding discussion in Chetty 2009).
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quite different from the estimates using the well-known ETI formula.
Another important question which we did not address in the present paper
is how to optimally design tax deductions. As argued above, most (if not all) de-
duction possibilities exist to internalize externalities. In order to have no welfare
consequences, i.e. not to distort optimal behavior of agents, the value of the de-
duction, i.e. t · D, has to correspond to the optimal Pigouvian subsidy. It is hard
to imagine that tax policy makers manage to set this optimal deduction level for
every single deduction possibility. Analyzing this could hence be a fruitful avenue
for future research.
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A Appendix
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables
Variable mean sd p10 p25 p75 p90
GI 55,484 150,912 25,630 31,842 61,264 87,824
TI 43,919 148,714 16,838 22,439 47,115 72,164
Dtotal 11,565 10,225 2,869 5,281 15,987 21,274
Dinc 1,402 6,012 920 920 1,840 2,522
Dother 10,164 7,881 1,744 4,077 14,235 19,090
Notes: Summary statistics for variables that are used as dependent variables in the
regressions. Gross income GI, taxable income TI, total deductions Dtotal, income-related
deductions Dinc, other (itemized) deductions Dother (where Dtotal = Dinc + Dother).
German tax return data for 2001-2008. Statistics are based on a representative 5% sample
of the universe of German taxpayers. All money variables in 2001 euro. N = 1, 996, 200.
Means and standard deviations (sd). pX indicates the X-th percentile.
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Figure 2: First-stage and reduced form
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Notes: Graphical evidence of the first-stage and reduced-form regressions. German tax
return data for 2001-2008. Graphs are based on a 5% sample of the universe of German
taxpayers. Panel A plots a fourth-order local polynomial regression of the change in the
log marginal net-of-tax rate (log taxable income) on the changes in the predicted log
marginal net-of-tax rate. Panel B is based on a fourth-order local polynomial regression
of the change in log taxable income on the changes in the predicted log marginal net-
of-tax rate. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals. The graphical illustration is
based on Weber (2014).
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Figure 3: Marginal tax rates and income distribution
Notes: Marginal tax rates in 2001 and 2008 and income distribution in 2001.
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